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by  Philp Jan Rothstein, FBCI

Planners developing and maintaining a contingency plan can learn the hard way that top management's lack of support, commitment and funding can be a project killer.

As appears in
InfoSecurity News Magazine.

Developing, implementing, testing and maintaining a contingency/recovery plan can certainly be a challenging and even a frustrating process. More and more contingency planners are learning the hard way that the toughest piece of the project may have little directly to do with actual development and implementation that gaining, cultivating and maintaining top management's support, commitment and funding can be a project killer.

      
Working in a consultative relationship with one client recently, I had the opportunity to observe and alter the dynamics of this relationship first-hand. Having worked with dozens of organizations wrestling with wavering top management commitment to disaster recovery, it was easy to spot the symptoms. Be warned that spotting the symptoms early does not always ensure a successful outcome.

      
The particular client is a successful, growing, medium-sized, financial services organization with close to a thousand employees in two principal locations. The MIS organization has had a disaster recovery plan in place for about four years. It is tested about twice yearly, although not aggressively, and generally well maintained. Top management had become complacent about MIS recovery: they assumed that MIS would be able to fully recover from virtually any disruption in a matter of hours and had paid little attention to disaster recovery over the past three or four years. A request from MIS for renewal of the multi-year hot site agreement, with a significant cost increase, had brought disaster recovery into top management's arena.

      
The Chief Financial Officer had been the mentor for disaster recovery during the last iteration, around four years ago. At that time, he supported MIS' commitment to contingency planning and encouraged appropriate funding. Since that time, much had changed: the company had not only more than doubled in size and revenue, but had acquired two smaller companies which now depended heavily on the corporate MIS operation. Technologically, the company had moved from mainframe, terminal-based systems to client-server applications and to numerous local area networks with varying degrees of sophistication, protection and control.

      
At a recent, semimonthly management committee meeting which was my introduction to the organization, the Chief Information Officer presented a synopsis of the planned enhancements to the MIS disaster recovery plan. He discussed the additional complexity of recovering the client/server and LAN environments, as well as the business risks associated with increased dependency on telecommunications and external networks. He recommended expanding the scope to address interim processing strategies for critical business units to cope while MIS was recovering the infrastructure, as well as to deal with data integrity during the disruption. He suggested further broadening the contingency planning scope to work-area recovery and to the telecommunications network, eventually to include voice recoverability. His presentation was professional, yet nontechnical.

      
The initial reaction from the dozen or so senior managers present was stunned silence. The Chief Operating Officer finally broke the ice by questioning the need for any recovery program at all, since, " . . . after all, we've never had a disaster." One of the business unit managers expressed concern with any additional work or expense for his already overloaded group. The Chief Financial Officer, who had been a supporter of disaster recovery in the past, noted the company's tenuous financial position as a result of the recent acquisitions and expressed concern with the additional expense. The Chief Information Officer, quite pale by this time, quietly offered to go back to his staff and reexamine the issues and options.

What Went Wrong?
It quickly became apparent to this consultant that the problem in this organization was not in contingency planning - the MIS disaster recovery plan could be characterized as at least adequate, if not aggressive. The trap this company fell into is a common one: operating on the basis of assumed expectations. The CEO, CFO, business unit managers and others outside MIS made several assumptions about MIS and its ability to recover from a disruption. Since, the last round of justification for a hot site contract more than four years ago, MIS had not communicated explicitly to clarify or contradict these assumptions. While the CIO's presentation and recommendations were probably on target, his audience was unable to reconcile these recommendations with the assumptions they had been living with for four years.

      
The biggest assumption was that MIS was somehow populated by wizards who could instantaneously, miraculously and painlessly handle any crisis that comes their way and have the business units operational within a few hours; the reality was that, at best, recovery from a major disruption would take 30-36 hours. The second assumption was that MIS had automatically integrated all of the diverse technologies and platforms which had popped up over the past four years into the disaster recovery program; the reality was that MIS did not even implement or operate many of these platforms. The third assumption was that, no matter what the cause or scope of disruption, MIS would recover all data accurately to the point of failure; the reality was that, at best, recovery would be to the prior night's backup and, most probably, to a point at least three to four nights prior.

      
The moral to this story is that with some delicate negotiation and outside consulting assistance, the top management of this enterprise eventually saw the light and not only approved the CIO's proposal but established a working committee to address company-wide business continuity. Along the way, among the lessons this CIO painfully learned were:

  • Don't rely on top management's, clients' or other stakeholders' assumptions about your ability to deliver salvation from disruption - document explicit disaster recovery service level agreements which spell out the limitations as well as the promises.
  • Communicate regularly to stakeholders any technological, business or operational changes which impact disaster recoverability - don't wait until there is no longer a practical option or alternative, or until business management has already acted on the basis of out-of-date assumptions.
  • Present disaster recovery options, constraints and alternatives to business unit managers and to top management early in their decision cycles - don't wait until they are committed to a course of action which impairs disaster recoverability.

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